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INTRODUCTION
Court packing1 has been, until recently, essentially a pejorative
term. Court packing was, politically and constitutionally, “out of
† Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The author would like to
thank the Law Review editors for their work and commitment to this project.
1 Mechanistically, court packing refers to altering the number of Justices on the Supreme
Court. There might be a variety of reasons to do so. This term, however, particularly refers to
efforts to impact the ideological composition of the court through transformative appointments.
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bounds,”2 in other words, “a wholly illegitimate means of seeking to
alter existing Supreme Court doctrine.”3 As a result, “[n]o serious
person, in either major political party, suggests court packing . . . .”4
That is no longer true.
The pressure to consider court packing began after the Senate
refused to hear confirmation proceedings for nominee Merrick Garland
and instead waited to allow incoming President Trump to fill that seat
months later.5 This refusal to fill a vacant seat, according to some, was
court packing because it effectively reduced the size of the Court during
the end of President Obama’s term.6 The renewed interest in court
packing did not turn out to be a fleeting idea or mere “academic

2 Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV.
465, 540–41 (2018). Grove explained that we find it “self-evident” that “‘packing’ the Supreme
Court is wrong.” Id. at 467; see also Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2020) (“The conventional wisdom has long been that federal court
packing is something the President and Congress ‘just cannot do.’ Even though the Constitution’s
text does not directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts to change their political
makeup, many have argued that there is a longstanding norm or convention against doing so.”
(quoting Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds out the Extraconstitutional Rule
of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 74 (Matthew D.
Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009))).
3 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and The Plural Judiciary: On the
Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1063–64 (2014).
4 Id. at 1064.
5 Levy, supra note 2, at 1125 (explaining that the justification for packing the Supreme Court
“rests, in part, on a claim that the majority-Republican Senate ‘unpacked’ the Supreme Court by
refusing to hold hearings upon the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland in 2016—in effect, the
Senate reduced the number of seats on the Court from nine to eight, for political gain” (citing
Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court
[https://
perma.cc/UM3P-DA9L])).
6 See id. at 1125, 1130 (“Specifically, there are those who argue that by holding open Justice
Scalia’s seat, the Republicans shrank or ‘unpacked’ the Court by one Justice.”).
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fantasy;”7 it has’ been in the wind regularly since then,8 including
making it onto the topics covered by Democratic presidential
candidates.9

7 Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 165
(2019). Epps and Sitaraman offer a variety of reforms including increasing the size of the Court.
Id.; see also Levy, supra note 2, at 1125–26 (“[Court packing] has unquestionably happened in
the past several years in state courts across the country. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Academic
interest in court packing has, if anything, increased since 2018. See e.g., Marin K. Levy, Packing
and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (2020) (examining the history of court
packing at the state level, and arguing that it has been done regularly and “successfully”); Joshua
Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2747 (2020); (examining the
history of court packing and arguing that it poses “unprecedented dangers” if pursued in the
current political climate); Stephen M. Feldman, Court Packing Time? Supreme Court Legitimacy
and Positivity Theory, 68 BUFFALO L. REV. 1519 (2020) (arguing that court packing is unlikely to
weaken the court’s popular support); Richard Mailey, Court-Packing in 2021: Pathways to
Democratic Legitimacy, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 35 (2020) (constructing an Ackerman-based
approach to legitimacy in court packing); Alex Badas, Policy Disagreement and Judicial
Legitimacy: Evidence from the 1936 Court-Packing Plan, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (2019) (arguing
that court packing is not a threat to legitimacy as much as policy disagreement is).
8 See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Pack the Supreme Court? Why We May Be Getting Closer, WASH.
POST (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/09/pack-supremecourt-why-we-may-be-getting-closer [https://perma.cc/SH3J-4UX3]; Michael Klarman, Why
Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/
blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/UM3P-DA9L]; Ian
Samuel, Kavanaugh Will Be on the US Supreme Court for Life. Here’s How We Fight Back,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/09/
kavanaugh-us-supreme-court-fight-back-court-packing [https://perma.cc/9KSU-73UZ]; David
Faris, Democrats Must Consider Court-Packing When They Regain Power. It’s the Only Way to
Save Democracy, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://wapo.st/2L3hHOC [https://perma.cc/
N2XQ-B4XX].
9 See Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went from a Fringe Idea to a Serious Democratic
Proposal, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/
court-packing-2020 [https://perma.cc/VT2M-9E87] (finding that a number of candidates
acknowledged the possibility of court packing in the future); see also Philip Elliott, The next Big
Idea in the Democratic Primary: Expanding the Supreme Court?, TIME (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:24 AM),
https://time.com/5550325/democrats-court-packing [https://perma.cc/AR5S-HE4W]; Burgess
Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, POLITICO (Mar. 18,
2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court1223625 [https://perma.cc/JR8L-C67N]; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7 (discussing the
Democratic candidates and their interest in court packing); Jordain Carney & Rachel Frazin,
Court-Packing Becomes New Litmus Test on Left, HILL (Mar. 19, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
thehill.com/homenews/senate/434630-court-packing-becomes-new-litmus-test-on-left [https://
perma.cc/MJ3V-5QXJ] (discussing candidate support for or willingness to consider court
packing); Michael Scherer, ‘Court Packing’ Ideas Get Attention from Democrats, WASH. POST
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://wapo.st/2J4MXxf [https://perma.cc/AL9K-XGA2] (noting the increased
viability of court packing, as measured by political interest).

2780

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:7

The death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg has only increased the fervor.10
In 2020’s first presidential debate, President Trump asked Democratic
nominee Joe Biden whether he supported court packing; Biden refused
to answer.11 In the Vice Presidential Debate, Mike Pence asked Kamala
Harris whether a Biden administration would seek to add seats to the
Supreme Court. Harris wouldn’t answer.12 In other contexts, Harris has
said she is open to the idea.13 Senator Ed Markey has suggested court
packing should be the plan, while Representative Alexandria OcasioCortez has said that “all options” should be “on the table” with respect
to the Supreme Court.14 Elizabeth Warren agrees, saying, “It’s a
conversation that’s worth having.”15
But why are we having this conversation? Historically speaking, I
argue court packing at the federal level, at least since the Civil War, is
inevitably linked to a thwarted desire for constitutional amendment.16
In light of the difficulty of formally amending our Constitution,
Presidents have used judicial appointments to leverage the Supreme
Court.17 A conservative might look at the history and say that the one
and only serious attempt at court packing, by Roosevelt in 1937, failed
because the legislation to change the court size failed. A liberal could

10 Senator Chuck Schumer said, “Let me be clear: If Leader McConnell and Senate
Republicans move forward with [a nomination], then nothing is off the table for next year.
Nothing is off the table.” Astead W. Herndon & Maggie Astor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death
Revives Talk of Court Packing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/
19/us/politics/what-is-court-packing.html [https://perma.cc/J76V-5QEW].
11 Dan Merica, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris Don’t Want to Talk About Changes to the
Supreme Court, CNN (Sept. 30, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/politics/joebiden-court-packing/index.html [https://perma.cc/JE3W-HD8B].
12 2020 Vice Presidential Debate, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2020/10/08/
pence-harris-court-packing-dbx-2020.cnn [https://perma.cc/3KBG-UX53].
13 Everett & Levine, supra note 9.
14 Jeff Jacoby, Biden Is Right to Be Leery of Court-Packing, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 27, 2020, 7:11
PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/10/27/opinion/biden-is-right-be-leery-court-packing
[https://perma.cc/SM3Z-FKB3]; Herndon & Astor, supra note 10.
15 Herndon & Astor, supra note 10. The conversation certainly seems to be happening now.
See Quinta Jurecic & Susan Hennessey, The Reckless Race to Confirm Amy Coney Barrett Justifies
Court Packing, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/10/skeptic-case-court-packing/616607 [https://perma.cc/DG3F-K3W3]; Emma Green,
Biden and Harris Need an Answer on Court Packing, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/10/biden-harris-court-packing-vice-presidentialdebate/616656 [https://perma.cc/5T4J-WTVF].
16 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 50–57 (1993).
17 Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1166 (1988)
(“Like Reagan, Roosevelt despaired of changing the Constitution by mobilizing the people to
enact formal amendments in the way described by [A]rticle V. Instead, he sought to change the
path of constitutional law by making transformative judicial appointments.”).
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look at that same history and say, “a switch in time saved nine.”18
Roosevelt’s efforts were successful, because packing the court was not a
desired outcome, only a mechanism for reaching a goal that was
obtained: constitutional change. Court packing is never an end in itself;
it is a method to establish constitutional change via, depending on your
perspective, either judicial activism or the interpretive power of the
Supreme Court. In light of this connection between court packing and
the desire for constitutional amendment, the best approach to analyzing
the viability of court packing as a political strategy within our
democracy is to examine court packing in the context of the broader
history of informal constitutional amendment.
This Article suggests the link between constitutional amendment
and court packing gives us the only good reason we currently have not
to pack the court. Recent political science scholarship on court packing
suggests that there are no excellent arguments against it. Evidence
suggests packing the court would not weaken the court’s legitimacy in
the eyes of the public.19 In fact, some evidence suggests the court’s
legitimacy is more threatened by a conflict between the policy views
(values) of the public and the court.20 One can surmise that a
disagreement on a particularly polarizing issue such as abortion might
even exacerbate the problem of legitimacy.
In the recent literature, Joshua Braver puts forth the primary
argument against court packing. Like those who argue against packing,
Braver focuses his concern on the relationship between court packing
and the danger to legitimacy.21 Braver’s argument situates the historical
examples of court packing in their political context, focusing on his
definition of court packing as inter-branch retaliation. Braver’s
argument has three weaknesses.
First, Braver’s argument does not contend with the scientific
literature that provides two key findings: the court is not weakened by
packing, and is weakened by policy conflicts with public values. Braver
acknowledges that the problem of relying on history to determine the
risk to legitimacy is that there are too few examples.22 Second, Braver’s
approach does not consider whether in the current political climate—
one that he describes as higher risk—the Court may already have

18 The phrase was a contemporary catchphrase used at the time. William E. Leuchtenburg,
FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 673.
19 Feldman, supra note 7, at 1525.
20 Badas, supra note 7, at 377.
21 Braver, supra note 7, at 2749 (noting that the question is the “stability of the constitutional
system as a whole”).
22 Id. at 2751 (“But court-packing is almost unprecedented, and U.S. history provides little
evidence about its effects on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.).
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damaged its legitimacy. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, I
would argue that in effectively reversing Roe v. Wade, the Court may
have damaged its legitimacy. In such circumstances, court packing
might provide no worse risks than other methods of remedying what is
already a crisis. Finally, and most relevant for this article, Braver’s
argument defines court packing as a retaliatory tactic between branches
of government.23 Focusing on retaliation reduces court packing to an
instrument of revenge. Such a mechanistic view doesn’t fit with the
context of the most important court-packing attempts, from the U.S.
Civil War to the present, which have all strongly aligned with pushing
for shifts in constitutional rights. Most importantly, I would posit that
the recent and current calls for court-packing fit the model of
emphasizing constitutional rights.
This article offers an alternative argument against court packing,
focusing on the nature of court packing as a tactic to create social
change. I argue that the best argument against court packing is that it
will not, at least in the long term, create a path to secure constitutional
rights.
My claim is whatever constitutional rights change one seeks to
accomplish by court packing, that change is unlikely to stabilize and
therefore not worth any risks to legitimacy that court packing might
bring.
The solution lies not in the Court, but in the Constitution, which
Justices are sworn to uphold, and specifically in Article V. We have
become unable to formally amend the Constitution, and this must
change.
The consensus has been that informal constitutional change
happens, at a minimum, through the process of interpretation or more
grandly through a variety of mechanisms including citizen-driven
minor revolutions. The arguments have focused on the legitimacy of
this change.
My point is not the legitimacy of informal amendment, but instead
the enduring effectiveness of it. Structural informal amendment
appears to be far more effective and lasting than rights-based informal
amendment. Informal constitutional amendment lacks the same
binding effect as formal amendment, whether it comes by
interpretation or by other mechanisms. The content of the new
constitutional norm is less clear, and the potential for slippage over time
is high.

23 Id. at 2749 (defining court packing as “striking back against the Supreme Court” and “the
most radical form of retaliation”).
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The problem is simple: Informal constitutional changes involve an
unavoidable fuzziness. In light of this, structural changes and rightsbased changes fare differently in the long term. Without text, it is much
more difficult to outline, preserve, and enforce a change in
constitutional rights. Changes in structure, on the other hand, benefit
from institutional mechanisms that preserve the status quo once
established.
The arguments for and against court packing should take this
understanding of informal constitutional change into account. Our
history suggests that court packing could be utilized more clearly and
lastingly for structural change, but not for a change in rights. Any
attempt at change in substantive rights likely would encounter slippage
in the future, even if temporarily effective.
The argument proceeds as follows: Part I explains the historical
and institutional relationship between court packing and constitutional
amendment. Part II sets forth the original arguments against court
packing and reevaluates those in the modern historical and legal
context. I conclude here that the original arguments against court
packing carry limited weight. This is not, however, an endorsement of
court packing. The heart of my argument is in evaluating court packing
in light of how different types of informal constitutional change have
endured. Thus, Part III focuses on making effective constitutional
change outside of Article V. This Part summarizes scholarship on
informal amendment and then considers how examples of rights-based
and structural change fared differently over time. This Part then
explains the values and risks of court packing in light of the potential
for informal constitutional change. I conclude that the better argument
against court packing is simply that it is unlikely to be effective for any
long-term informal constitutional change that is rights-based.
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND
COURT PACKING

If citizens object to a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court,
the remedy is found in a constitutional amendment.24 Amendment is a
24 This presumes, in some cases, that there is no part of the Constitution that is unamendable.
Some commentators would debate this. See Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United
States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 13 (András Koltay ed., 2015) (discussing whether the Constitution requires
unamendability). But see JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY:
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 70 (2010) (“Of course, a constitution prohibiting the amendment of
some part of it could be overturned by revolution, but the same is true of any constitution.”);
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legal mechanism that, if done formally and correctly,25 is outside the
purview of the Supreme Court because it is not subject to the challenge
of judicial review.26 Bruce Ackerman explains, “[T]he familiar
refutation runs, the Supreme Court’s judgment may be overruled by
constitutional amendment. But this process is so cumbersome that it
can serve as a safety valve only under the most extreme conditions.”27
The other option involves somehow changing the composition of the
Court’s votes. In that way, constitutional amendment and court packing
are, to some degree, natural alternatives.
The Roosevelt-era court packing discussions specifically relied on
the idea that court packing was directly linked to changing the
Constitution via interpretation. Testimony in front of the Senate
Judiciary Committee made that clear. Edwin S. Corwin, a leading
constitutional scholar, explained:
I think the realities of the situation are these: In the first place, the
doctrines of constitutional law of the majority of the Court involve
the entire program of the administration in a fog of doubt as to
constitutionality; and second, that cloud [of] doubt can be dispelled
within a reasonable time only by reestablishing that mode of reading
the Constitution which adapts it to present needs.”28

President Franklin Roosevelt took essentially the same approach,
although ironically through a different contention. Roosevelt claimed
the Court was “reading into the Constitution words and implications
which are not there.”29 Roosevelt specifically tied the process of
interpretation to the potential “to amend the Constitution by the
arbitrary exercise of judicial power.”30
Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961, 1002 (2011)
(noting that one reason for unamendability provisions of constitutions is to protect basic
structural provisions that are necessary to democratic governance).
25 Correctness might be less surely attainable than we would expect, as there are procedural
uncertainties. See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 913, 914 (2014).
26 Another way of thinking about this is that the process of judicial review has no access to
proposed constitutional amendments: “[I]t is ‘difficult to comprehend how [a] proposed
constitutional amendment [could] be “unconstitutional” under our Constitution.’” Lawrence
Friedman, The Potentially Unamendable State Constitutional Core, 69 ARK. L. REV. 317, 318
(2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Answer of the Justices to the House of Representatives,
377 N.E.2d 915, 916 n.2 (Mass. 1978)).
27 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1057 (1984).
28 G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of “Marbury v. Madison,” 89 VA. L. REV.
1463, 1545 (2003) (quoting Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearing on S. 1392 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 167–68 (1937) (testimony of Edward S. Corwin)).
29 Id. at 1547.
30 Id.
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EVALUATING THE ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST COURT PACKING

There are a variety of arguments against court packing, many of
them dating to the 1937 court packing plan put forward by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt.31 This Part of this Article revisits that history
briefly and then focuses on the primary objections, evaluating them in
light of recent historical developments. The original arguments against
court packing remain the most common. These include a threat to the
Court’s legitimacy, a loss of judicial independence and deviation from
a long-established constitutional norm. These arguments are, to some
degree, intertwined.32 With that said, there is some value to separating
them as much as possible for analytical clarity. Justice Breyer once
described judicial independence as “revolv[ing] around the theme of
how to assure that judges decide according to law, rather than according
to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of
government.”33 In the context of court packing arguments, however, it
is more useful to separate “their own whims” from the “the will of the
political branches.”34 Legitimacy of the Supreme Court is related
directly to the idea that the judicial branch upholds the Constitution
and the rule of law without judges making decisions based on their own
political positions. That is to say, legitimacy requires judges to not make
decisions based on internal pressures such as personal social, religious
or moral beliefs. Judicial independence, on the other hand, concerns
itself more with the ability of the other branches to either force a
decision or exact revenge for one. Judicial independence focuses on the
ability of the judiciary to withstand external political pressure.35
Legitimacy, then, may logically be damaged if the public believes that
judges make decisions based on their personal beliefs when those beliefs
do not align with the values of the American public.36

31 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 269–87 (2017) (discussing
arguments against court packing).
32 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1038 (2000) (finding in Roosevelt’s era three “interconnected, yet
distinct arguments” against court packing).
33 Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
191, 217–18 (2012) (quoting Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996)).
34 Id. at 217.
35 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 43
(1994).
36 Recent research supports this conclusion. See Badas, supra note 7, at 377.
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A Brief History of Court Packing

The story of Roosevelt’s court packing plan has been described as
a “twice-told tale,”37 but this is a vast understatement.38 Court packing
history is a perpetual favorite, perhaps precisely because it is so political.
Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to tell a historical tale without
adopting an interpretive position and moreover a lens that is, at least a
little, either conservative or liberal. However, histories of the court
packing plan tend to be written and rewritten with determinedly
political glosses: Did the court packing plan fail or was it abandoned as
unnecessary?
The pivotal moment is often regarded as the “switch in time that
saved nine.” The phrase tends to represent a particular reading of events
that implies the Supreme Court switched political and interpretive
positions intentionally and at least partially due to the threat of court
packing. Bruce Ackerman has endorsed this reading of the history.39
More recently, Barry Cushman argued that there was no politically
motivated switch in time.40 Cushman not only disputed the political
explanation but also offered a non-political alternative reading of
events. So many others have followed Cushman, that they may now be
fairly divided into two camps: those like Ackerman, who saw the switch
as motivated by external, political factors, and those, like Cushman,
who gave internal, non-political explanations for the switch.41
For the purposes of this Article, a more important part of the
history is the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which
represented the views of both parties and sharply criticized the court
packing plan. The report described court packing as designed “to

Leuchtenburg, supra note 18, at 673.
For a brief review of many of the accounts of the court packing attempt of 1937, see Daniel
E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71 (2010).
39 See ACKERMAN, supra note 16, at 49, 119.
40 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (arguing there was no sudden reversal caused by external
pressures such as court packing); see also Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80
VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
41 Ho & Quinn, supra note 38, at 71 (dividing the two camps of historians into “internalists”
and “externalists”). Ho and Quinn created an empirical study of the historical moment, coming
down not entirely squarely on either side, but not supporting the focus on the external force of
the court packing plan. Ho and Quinn advised, “For internalists, the explanation as to differences
in cases and litigating strategies must correspond to the abrupt temporary shift we identify.
Unless the cases in the 1936 term themselves are sharply different, they cannot be reconciled with
this evidence.” Id. at 102–03. Similarly, they concluded, “For externalists, our account seems most
consistent with the focus on the 1936 landslide election, thereby rebutting naive accounts that
Roberts’s vote in Parrish was a direct result of the court-packing plan.” Id. at 103.
37
38
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punish the Justices” for their decisions.42 The plan was, therefore, “an
invasion of judicial power,” an encroachment on judicial
independence.43 The report found that court packing required a
“dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle.”44 This report
points towards two of the most common arguments against court
packing: interference with judicial independence and the existence of a
constitutional norm against court packing.
B.

Court Packing and Legitimacy of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is famously known as the least dangerous
branch. One reason for this assertion is the Court’s lack of recourse if
citizens do not respect the decisions of the Court. It has neither “purse
nor sword.” The ability of the Court to function effectively depends on
the popular acceptance of the Court’s legitimacy.45
Legitimacy, in part, stems from the Court’s special relationship to
the Constitution. “The very idea of a Constitution turns on the
separation of the legal and the political realms.”46 This idea of a higher,
constitutional law and an ordinary and more political law, was
prevalent at the time of drafting.47 The Supreme Court, as interpreter of
the Constitution, assumed the role of maintaining this division and,
theoretically, remaining above politics. Legitimacy is at risk when the
public no longer has faith in this division.
Consider Posner and Sunstein’s account of institutional flip-flops:
An institutional flip-flop is a reversal of one’s position on an
institutional value based on partisan or political interests or

42 Leuchtenburg, supra note 18, at 675 (quoting REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 75-711 (1937)).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 This Article follows Epps and Sitaraman in adopting Richard Fallon’s sociological meaning
of the term legitimacy, which “involves prevailing public attitudes toward governments,
institutions, or decisions.” Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 151 n.4 (citing RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 21 (2018)).
46 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 695 (1996). This division, Sullivan argues, is the
reason why we should be cautious of constitutional amendment: “Frequent constitutional
amendment can be expected to undermine this respect by breaking down the boundary between
law and politics. The more you amend the Constitution, the more it seems like ordinary
legislation. And the more the Constitution is cluttered up with specific regulatory directives, the
less it looks like a fundamental charter of government. Picture the Ten Commandments with a
few parking regulations thrown in.” Id. at 696.
47 Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 275 (1989).
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substantive commitments. Here is a way of specifying the idea:
People flip-flop when (1) at two distinct points in time they take
different positions on the validity of a claim of institutional authority
for a set of policy decisions, and (2) there are no relevant differences
that would justify the shift.48

Posner and Sunstein regard the Supreme Court as not at all
immune from flip-flops, concluding that “[w]ithin the Supreme Court,
it is also easy to find at least apparent flip-flops.”49
Flip-flops are, to a certain degree, both normal and to be expected.
Within the Supreme Court, the risk comes from what Posner and
Sunstein would describe as tactical flip-flops.50 Posner and Sunstein give
this example of a tactical flip-flop:
Recall that when Republicans hold a majority of the seats in the
Senate, many of them decry the use of the filibuster by the
Democratic minority, claiming that it is antidemocratic; but when
Republicans are in the minority, many of them claim that the
filibuster is sanctioned by the Senate’s traditions.51

The problem is that an “apparently principled argument (about
checks and balances or the need to break a logjam)” is applied
situationally and inconsistently, and “in the interest of a substantive
goal, which is all that they really care about.”52 Posner and Sunstein
recognize that “[t]actical flip-flops are ubiquitous in politics,” but we
expect more of the courts.53 If we expect tactical flip-flops of the Court,
then the Court lacks legitimacy, because it is issuing decisions that are
not based on principled reasoning and reliance to law, but instead
opportunistically taking advantage of those to reach a political end.
Some scholars believe this is exactly what happens on the Supreme
Court: Justices select legal norms in service to personal political
beliefs.54 This depletes the public belief in legitimacy of the Court.
In terms of legitimacy and court packing, the weakness of the
legitimacy argument lies in the assumption that the Court has a high
level of legitimacy. Evidence suggests otherwise currently. Why is the
timing of a judicial nomination so important? Because we all feel sure
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 493 (2016).
Id. at 500.
50 Id. at 511.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 512.
53 Id. at 511.
54 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 80 (2002) (“[J]udges may pick and choose among precedents to find those
that accord with their policy preferences, while simultaneously asserting that these are also the
ones that best accord with the facts of the case at hand.”).
48
49
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of how the nominee will vote on key issues. That is, it is politics, not
law. What is so unseemly about court packing? It means the Supreme
Court is a deeply political institution. Having the public and Congress
in a battle over the timing of a judicial nominee means exactly the same
thing. In other words, it is a bit late now: The emperor has already lost
his clothes. On our current trajectory, “it will become impossible to
regard the [C]ourt as anything but a partisan institution.”55
The problem of legitimacy has become critical: “[I]t is striking how
many commentators—including prominent constitutional scholars, a
former Attorney General, and current members of Congress—have
recently questioned the legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court.
Indeed, some critics suggest that the situation is so bad as to warrant
extreme measures . . . .”56 This critical low of legitimacy definitely
undermines the argument against court packing.
To understand the current crisis of legitimacy, it is important to
look to the recent history of the nominations process. But first, to set a
baseline, consider how the process looked in retrospect after
Rehnquist’s nomination in the late 1980s. William Ross felt he could
accurately describe the hearings as “turbulent.”57 Ross described the
Senate as deviating from “its customary practice of confirming the
president’s nominee by an overwhelming vote,” and instead approving
“Rehnquist by the comparatively narrow vote of sixty-five to thirtythree, the thinnest margin any successful nominee has received since
1912.”58 Ross even felt the need to caution scholars that “[t]he Senate’s
careful and prolonged consideration of the Rehnquist nomination is a
reminder that the Senate is not merely a rubber stamp for the
president’s nomination, even though the president’s choice rarely
encounters serious opposition.”59
We do not live in the world Ross described, not even close. In three
decades, we have shifted to a highly confrontational and politicized
appointments process.60 If Rehnquist’s hearings signaled a departure
55 Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be
Just?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-courtnominee-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V52W-3HHU].
56 Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132. HARV. L. REV. 2240,
2240–41 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT (2018)).
57 William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 633 (1987).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 For a more detailed account of the politicization of the appointments process, see David
R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (2008)
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from the traditional process, the Bork hearings finalized it. As
Ackerman wrote just afterwards, the Senate did not “preserve[ ] the
proceeding’s deliberative character.”61 Bork had great qualifications, but
the Senate was uninterested. Bork symbolized political change.
Ackerman concluded, “Thus the scene had already been set for tragedy:
if the Senate and the country decided that President Reagan should not
be granted Roosevelt-like authority, they could express this judgment
only by rejecting a nominee who, by normal criteria, was superbly
qualified for the office.”62 From this point forward, qualifications would
no longer be a defining question for the advice and consent process and
politics became the focus: “The shadow of the failed 1987 nomination
of Robert Bork has loomed over the judicial appointments process, and
the recent vacancies were widely expected to produce a large-scale
confirmation battle, with the prospect of nominees being defeated as
Bork was.”63
The Bush era solidified the new political nature of the
appointments process, when Democrats followed the pattern
Republicans had established in the Reagan era. Democrats successfully
filibustered six Bush nominees and ignored Republican frustration.64
Scholars did not help with their advice to senators to focus on
substantive, political views rather than qualifications.65
Merrick Garland’s nomination process was one step worse. The
Senate would not even look at his qualifications. When Justice Scalia
died, that very day, Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican Majority
Leader, announced a moratorium on considering nominees that would
last until the next President took office.66 This move only heightened
the political nature of the appointments process. The candidates
immediately focused on substantive views of potential nominees:

(reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES (2006); JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007)).
61 Bruce A. Ackerman, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: Transformative
Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1988).
62 Id. at 1169.
63 Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court Nominations, 2006
SUP. CT. REV. 401, 401.
64 See Laura T. Gorjanc, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in
Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2004) (discussing the history of the
nominations and the flippant responses of Democrats to the Republican outcry).
65 Whittington, supra note 63, at 401–02 (describing Tribe’s and Sunstein’s advice to
senators).
66 Evan Osnos, The Death of Antonin Scalia, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-death-of-antonin-scalia
[https://perma.cc/
ZBQ7-Z6W6].
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During the 2016 election, former President Donald Trump
publicly vowed to “appoint [J]ustices to the United States Supreme
Court who [would] uphold our laws and our Constitution,” stated that
“Second Amendment people” could stop Hillary Clinton’s Supreme
Court picks, and released a list of Justices whom he purportedly planned
to consider nominating to the Court’s bench. 67 On the other hand,
then-Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton declared that she would
nominate only Justices who were willing to overturn the Court’s
controversial Citizens United decision regarding corporate campaign
contributions, criticized the Court’s precedent regarding the Second
Amendment, and denounced Trump’s list of prospective nominees as
littered with “extreme ideologues.”68
Most recently, Kavanaugh’s confirmation vote was one of the
closest yet, with only two votes to spare.69 Moreover, “Justice
Kavanaugh gave testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee that
many viewed as ‘nakedly partisan.’”70
The culmination of this history is unfortunate: “For a variety of
structural, external, and judicial reasons, however, the politics of federal
judicial appointments have fundamentally changed in the last eighty
years, especially since the 1980s. Today, for the Supreme Court and
United States circuit courts of appeals, the appointments process is
high-stakes, explosively partisan, and often nasty.”71
When President Obama nominated Garland, he warned that a
failure to consider the nominee by the Senate would indicate that the
process was broken “beyond repair.”72 That now represents the
consensus among scholars, as well as many members of the Senate who
have described the process as: a “mess,” “abysmal,” “broken,” “going in
the wrong direction,” and downright “disorderly, contentious, and
unpredictable.”73 Looking at the criticisms, scholars concluded “there
does seem to be general agreement that politics, philosophy, and

67 Benjamin Pomerance, Justices Denied: The Peculiar History of Rejected United States
Supreme Court Nominees, 80 ALB. L. REV. 627, 627–28 (2017).
68 Id.
69 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 150.
70 Id.
71 David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2008) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE:
REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)).
72 Adam Liptak & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shadow of Merrick Garland Hangs over the next
Supreme Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/
ginsburg-vacancy-garland.html [https://perma.cc/CM7N-8SX3].
73 Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Nancy Staudi, & René Lindstadt, The Role of Qualifications
in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1146
(2005).
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ideology now dominate a process that should emphasize ethics,
integrity, and competence.”74 The history is not pretty, and, more
bluntly, it lacks integrity. Unsurprisingly, “[t]he predictable result is a
Supreme Court whose Justices—on both sides—are more likely to vote
along party lines than ever before in American history. . . . That
development presents a grave threat to the Court’s legitimacy . . . .”75
A key indicator that legitimacy has become critical is the
prevalence of doing what I like to call Supreme Court math, or cocktail
party constitutional law. It is the bare guessing of the outcomes of cases,
based on the personal political leanings of Justices. For example:
If Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Breyer all leave the bench during
President Trump’s term of office, President Trump will hold the
power of appointing a total of four Supreme Court Justices. No
President since Ronald Reagan has filled four or more vacancies on
this powerful bench. Yet the impact of the new slate of nominees
extends far beyond mere numbers. If the above-described scenario
comes true, President Trump would replace the Court’s
longstanding conservative leader (Scalia), the Court’s two more
influential liberal Justices (Ginsburg and Breyer), and—perhaps
most importantly—the swing voter on whom so many 5-4 decisions
in recent years have hinged (Kennedy). With such a slate of
nominees, the President could re-cast the Court’s overall
decisionmaking tendencies in a way that could reverberate for
decades to come. For example, if President Trump decides to appoint
reliably conservative Justices to fill all four roles, it would give the
Court a substantial conservative majority, with the four new
conservatives joining Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel Alito,
and Chief Justice John Roberts to reach a 7-2 conservative advantage.
Conversely, if President Trump appointed four Justices who
unexpectedly turned out to be reliably liberal voters, it would
establish a definite liberal majority on the Court, with the four new
jurists joining Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan to
form a 6-3 liberal lead.76

When the outcomes of cases can be accurately predicted this way
by counting Justices as either reliably conservative or liberal, then the
distinction between politics and higher law is lost, and the Court can be
fairly described as experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. Predicting
Supreme Court jurisprudence should not sound like debating the
baseball playoffs.

74
75
76

Id.
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 150–51.
Pomerance, supra note 67, at 631.
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The question of whether this type of math works to accurately
predict cases—and particularly in lieu of precedent—has long been
debated.77 For our current purposes, however, the winner of this debate
is irrelevant. The question is whether people believe that case outcomes
can be predicted by this simple, party-based math.
The lack of faith in Justices applying law over politics shines even
more in the context of recusal or disqualification. Scalia once prompted
outrage because he “declined to disqualify himself from hearing a case
in which Vice President Dick Cheney was a named party, after flying
with the Vice President on a government jet to Louisiana for a weekend
of duck hunting, while the appeal was pending.”78 Similar and even
worse incidents have peppered the state supreme courts in recent
years.79
If concerns for the legitimacy of the Court have been a primary
reason to oppose court packing, it would be hard to say that they exist
now as they did in 1937. A lack of legitimacy does not necessarily mean
we can ignore a threat to it; indeed, possibly we should consider such a
threat all the more cautiously if there is little capital left. But it is also
possible to see court packing as a part of the solution,80 and it is one that
has been adopted by a number of Democrats.

77 For a review of this debate and examination of its two sides, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 905 (2005). In brief, Gerhardt
separates the debates into two sides. The social scientists “conceive[ ] of precedent—understood
as prior judgments or rulings of the Supreme Court as sources of authority for its decisions—as
having very weak influence, if any at all, in constitutional adjudication.” Id. Legal scholars refuse
this evidence, “conceiv[ing] of precedent as having sufficient force to constrain the Supreme
Court.” Id.
78 Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671,
673–74 (2011).
79 Famously, West Virginia Justice Brent Benjamin refused to recuse himself due to his
relationship with Massey Energy company’s CEO. Later, the Supreme Court ruled that Benjamin
should have recused himself. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). More
recently in West Virginia, Justice Evan Jenkins refused to recuse himself, creating a public
backlash. See Ken Ward, Jr., Jenkins Declines to Step Aside from Natural Gas Case, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/wv_troubled_transition/
jenkins-declines-to-step-aside-from-natural-gas-case/article_2360e8b7-9535-5f65-8f0ee5a765f32ac0.html [https://perma.cc/477D-5CPM]. A similar incident occurred in Illinois: “[A]
newly elected Illinois Supreme Court justice provoked media ire after he declined to disqualify
himself from hearing a case in which a corporate defendant and its employees had made
significant contributions to his election campaign while the appeal was pending. In 2005, that
same justice cast the deciding vote in the defendant’s favor.” Geyh, supra note 78, at 673.
80 See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7 (suggesting increasing the number of Justices as a part
of one solution to the current Supreme Court crisis).

2794

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:7

Kamala Harris’s justification for court packing lies precisely on the
idea of remedying the lack of public faith in the Court.81 Harris
explained that she was open to the idea of court packing precisely
because “[w]e are on the verge of a crisis of confidence in the Supreme
Court.”82 She is not alone in that perspective: “The Court’s legitimacy
will be questioned in the coming years—perhaps as never before.
Indeed, even those who think the threat might be overblown still believe
that coming challenges to the Court need to be taken seriously.”83
The crisis of legitimacy may derive in part from the overall political
dynamic of hyper-polarization that has developed,84 but the Supreme
Court may be at the nexus. Kavanaugh’s confirmation process “deeply
divided the country,” but was only a part of a trend of “an increasingly
politicized fight over Justices.”85 Supreme Court legitimacy is called into
question,86 because we have “a Supreme Court whose Justices—on both
sides—are more likely to vote along party lines than ever before in
American history.”87
C.

Court Packing and Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is another mechanism for ensuring the
Court is insulated from political pressures—in this case external ones.
“[J]udicial independence is essential, because it insulates judges from
external interference with their impartial judgment that could corrupt
81 See Quinta Jurecic & Susan Hennessey, The Reckless Race to Confirm Amy Coney Barrett
Justifies Court Packing, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/10/skeptic-case-court-packing/616607 [https://perma.cc/E5MR-8QFM] (developing an
argument for adding Justices to restore legitimacy to the Court); see also Ramesh Ponnuru, Biden
and Harris Should Just Be Honest About Court-Packing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-07/biden-harris-should-be-honestabout-court-packing [https://perma.cc/9SSB-GFG5] (critiquing the Jurecic and Hennessey
argument). Ponnuru attributes the argument to Jurecic and Hennessey, but it already was made
by both Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris. See Herndon & Astor, supra note 10; Everett &
Levine, supra note 9.
82 Everett & Levine, supra note 9.
83 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 165–66.
84 See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1430, 1432 (2018) (“From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have
anguished over a breakdown in constitutional norms.”).
85 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 150.
86 Epstein & Posner, supra note 55. But see Robert Barnes, Polls Show Trust in Supreme Court,
but There Is Growing Interest in Fixed Terms and Other Changes, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/polls-show-trust-in-supreme-court-butthere-is-growing-interest-in-fixed-terms-and-other-changes/2019/10/24/dcbbcba4-f64c-11e98cf0-4cc99f74d127_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZN32-AYHH].
87 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 7, at 150.
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the rule of law.”88 Judicial independence is a crucial norm for the rule
of law across the world: “[T]he Constitution Project declares that
‘judges are supposed to be responsive only to the rule of law and the
Constitution, not to majority will or public, political, or media
pressure . . . .’”89 Protecting judicial independence means preventing
other institutions—from parties to branches—from directly interfering
with the judgment of the Justices, either individually or as a group.
Congress has opportunities to impact the Court through such
mechanisms as impeachment or changes in the Court’s jurisdiction. But
more informally, Congress can “hurt the Court by refusing to raise
judicial salaries to keep up with inflation, by ignoring the Chief Justice’s
administrative and personnel requests, and by overloading the judiciary
with too many cases.”90 All of these mechanisms provide Congress with
opportunities to infringe upon the Court’s judicial independence.
From the beginning, a loss of judicial independence was one of the
key arguments made against court packing.91
In one crucial way the current situation differs from the 1937
attempt at court packing: In 1937 what Roosevelt needed was a change
in jurisprudence. There were specific decisions that Roosevelt wanted
overturned because those decisions impeded his New Deal plan for a
federally based financial recovery from the Great Depression. The
desire to reverse those decisions specifically was never a secret.
Roosevelt acknowledged the intent directly, and Senate testimony
confirmed.
I believe that in the current situation, court packing is not about
changing a particular decision or set of decisions from the Supreme
Court. Instead, the desire stems from an understanding of the political
makeup of the Court itself. The ability to do Supreme Court math
accurately is again the problem. Both Congress and the public seem to
believe that they will be able to accurately predict how Justices will
decide cases based on political parties. In that way, it is the loss of
legitimacy that is truly at issue, not a loss of judicial independence. Nor
is the challenge to the Court’s independence the same when packing
would not be retributive for a particular decision, but instead a more
generalized desire to ensure the political balance of the Court.

Geyh, supra note 33, at 217–18.
Id. (quoting The Newsroom Guide to Judicial Independence, CONST. PROJECT (2006),
https://archive.constitutionproject.org/pdf/37.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2LG-B9J2]).
90 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 35, at 40 n.52 (citing Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 345–47 (1988)).
91 Friedman, supra note 32, at 1038.
88
89
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Court Packing as Against Constitutional Norms

Constitutionality is not a strong argument against court packing.
Recently, scholars have regularly concluded that changing the number
of Justices is constitutionally acceptable.92 Historically, the idea of
constitutionality was more intertwined with the idea that not changing
the size of the Court was an inviolable constitutional norm. Raymond
Moley testified before the Senate, stating that “that there was now a
‘custom of the Constitution’ against Court-packing, which he
contended was ‘as binding upon public officials as a written provision
of the Constitution itself.’”93 Similarly, Erwin Griswold testified both
that it was possible court packing was unconstitutional and that “not all
things that are constitutional are things that should be done.”94
The norm certainly has been strong in American constitutional
culture.95 In 2018, Tara Leigh Grove wrote about the crystallization of
conventions into legal rules and used court packing as an example of
why “such crystallization is not necessary.”96 She explained, “There can
be a strong convention against a court-curbing measure, even if the
legal community thinks the measure would be ‘legal.’”97 She concluded
the example with a strong statement of how court packing would never
now be considered.98 Yet, now we know that court packing is not far
from consideration by reasonable minds. A norm is culture, and culture
changes.
The norm against court packing may have existed, in part, due to
the fact that court packing didn’t succeed in 1937 and has not been
utilized since then. Josh Chafetz argued,

92 Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds out the Extraconstitutional Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 69, 74 (Matthew D.
Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds. 2009) (concluding that “we have excellent textual and
historical reasons to think that the Constitution poses no obstacle . . . .”); see also Grove, supra
note 2, at 541.
93 Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 280 (quoting Reorganization of the Fed. Judiciary:
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 546 (1937) (statement of Raymond
Moley)).
94 Id. (quoting Reorganization of the Fed. Judiciary: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. 767 (1937) (statement of Erwin Griswold)).
95 This is true to the degree that court packing can essentially be used as an insult. Thus, Barry
Friedman could write that something “smacks of Court-packing” with scholars understanding
his critique. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 430 (1998).
96 Grove, supra note 2, at 541.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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The claim that some behavior is unprecedented carries with it a
distinct whiff of impermissibility: if it’s never been done before, then
at the very least the burden is on those who would want to do it to
show that it is permissible. A thumb is very firmly placed on the scale
against constitutional novelty.99

In the current climate, a primary challenge to the norm reaches
precisely to Chafetz’s point: it may not be novel. Some commentators
have reduced the Democratic reliance on the Garland nomination
refusal to a revenge-like quest of tit-for-tat. But the recent history
matters in light of Chafetz’s point. If a filibuster or a declared
moratorium on appointment hearings accomplishes the same
purpose—changing the size of the Supreme Court—then novelty is no
longer as viable an argument.
Overall, the arguments against court packing cannot reasonably be
evaluated now on the same terms as they were in 1937. The Supreme
Court and the appointments process have become highly politicized,
diminishing the public understanding of their legitimacy. For some of
the same reasons, we doubt the existence of judicial independence, at
least on the Supreme Court. We might be willing to venture further
afield to locate a solution, or senators and presidential candidates would
not be discussing court packing. To some degree, all of the original
arguments against court packing have lost their shine. There is,
however, another reason to forego court packing, and that reason is
based on our history of formal and informal constitutional change and
the effectiveness of those changes.
III.

MAKING EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

This Part examines the formal constitutional amendment
procedure under Article V and evaluates its current availability as a
mechanism for change. After concluding that the potential for formal
amendment is limited, this Part examines the evidence that informal
constitutional change happens and summarizes the scholarship on the
methods and legitimacy of informal change. Finally, I consider
examples used to support informal constitutional change and evaluate
the long-term effectiveness of rights-based and structural changes.
Using this evidence, I examine how and whether court packing could
be used to achieve informal constitutional change.

99 Josh Chafetz, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term: Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation
Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 96 (2017).
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The Failure Formal Amendment

“Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the
amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same
process.”100
The framers debated proper mechanisms for constitutional
change, including forcing change on a regular basis,101 and settled on
Article V as the explicit formal method for constitutional change. The
framers regularly expressed fear of majoritarian politics, including
regular movements to amend the Constitution. Adapting a stable,
relatively permanent mechanism for formal amendment may have been
an attempt to codify science over impulse.102 Such a process reinforces
the distinction between a higher constitutional law and everyday
politics.103
The Article V process is onerous.104 Compared to other
constitutions around the world, the U.S. Constitution is one of the
hardest to amend in terms of the mechanics required.105 Empirically
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
Hamburger, supra note 47, at 300–01 (discussing the positions of framers, including
Jefferson who wanted a sunset provision on the constitution as well as ordinary laws).
102 Kahn argued, “The movement from the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution,
however, was one of increasing realization of the need for a science to inform this right of political
experimentation. The people may have ‘an inherent right . . . to alter or abolish,’ but without
political science, what ‘to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness’ is not
likely to do so in practice.” Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 453–54 (1989). George Washington’s farewell address
affirmed this perspective: “If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way
which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this in
one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed.” Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce
Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 140 n.1 (1998) (quoting
Washington’s speech).
103 Bruce Ackerman explains, “[A]ll the time and effort required to push an initiative down
the higher law-making track would be wasted unless the Constitution prevented future normal
politicians from enacting statutes that ignored the movement’s higher law achievement.” BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 9 (1993 ed.).
104 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692 (1996) (explaining the mechanisms and
concluding that “[o]ur Constitution is extraordinarily difficult to amend”). Notably, the process
does not seem to be entirely clear in terms of the mechanics. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 677, 681 (1993) (describing the lack of clarity in the amendment process).
105 DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 171 (2006); see also Lawrence
G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 895 (1990) (“An important part of
what makes the Constitution so conceptually awkward is its literal incorrigibility: the
Constitution is markedly obdurate to textual change.”).
100
101
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speaking, the amendment process has rarely succeeded.106 Still,
amendment occurred with some regularity in the earlier years.
Like the Supreme Court appointments process, the Article V
amendment process has changed drastically. Our most recent successful
attempt at amendment took 202 years, culminating in ratification by a
state that did not exist when the amendment was proposed.107 Within
living memory, we seem incapable of federal constitutional change. This
is despite the fact that the states manage the feat regularly.108 Despite the
framers’ attempts to create an effective and enduring amendment
process,109 scholars agree that the Article V process has become nonviable.110
B.

Accounts of Informal Constitutional Change

In the absence of a functioning formal amendment process,
scholars have focused on how constitutional law changed

106 Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis
of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 112-113 (1993) (“Since the
adoption of the Constitution in 1789, only twenty-seven amendments have been enacted out of
the more than 10,000 proposed in Congress.”).
107 See Paulsen, supra note 104, at 679 (discussing Michigan’s ratification of the TwentySeventh Amendment).
108 See JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN THE
AMERICAN STATES 1–8 (2018) (explaining that states use of formal amendment both regularly
and effectively); John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism,
41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 27 (2016) (describing formal amendment as the primary method of
state constitutional change); see also Jonathan L. Marshfield, Courts and Informal Constitutional
Change in the States, 51 NEW ENG. L. REV. 453, 456–58 (2017) (arguing that informal
constitutional change is presumed to happen less in the states because of lower barriers to the
formal amendment process). Notably, there is evidence that the states consciously adopted lower
barriers to amendment in an effort to restrain judicial activism. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The
Amendment Effect, 98 B.U.L. Rev. 55, 59 (2018) (“Records from early-twentieth-century state
constitutional conventions in the United States show that several states made their amendment
procedures more flexible based on the assumption that this would restrain judges.”).
109 See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 106, at 112–13 (explaining that the Article V
process was specifically created to be less burdensome than the alternative under the Articles of
Confederation).
110 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (examining
Article V’s limitations and arguing for a new constitutional convention); Serena Mayeri, A New
E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1223, 1291 (2009) (noting agreement that after the Equal Rights Amendment the Article V
“process was no longer a viable path to constitutional change, except perhaps for very specific,
technical alterations”); Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article
V, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1029 (discussing Article V’s decline and unavailability).
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nevertheless.111 Heather Gerken wrote, “Anyone who was awake in law
school is aware that constitutional meaning has evolved over time even
as the text has not.”112 Although scholars debate both the pathways and
the legitimacy of informal or extra-textual amendment, she concludes,
“I take it that no one doubts that it has done so.”113 Thurgood Marshall
similarly saw opportunities for informal change:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever
“fixed” at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom,
foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly
profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was
defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.
When contemporary Americans cite “The Constitution,” they
invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the framers barely
began to construct two centuries ago.114

Some norms seem to be effectively entrenched such that they
exceed everyday politics. David Strauss concluded, “There are settled
principles of constitutional law that are difficult to square with the
language of the document, and many other settled principles that are
plainly inconsistent with the original understandings.”115 Strauss
argued, “[W]hen people interpret the Constitution, they rely not just on
the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly
through judicial decisions, over the years.”116 He discounted the role of

111 For an introduction to these issues, see generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991); Morton J. Horowitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32 (1993); RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395
(1995); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1465 (2001).
112 Heather Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our
Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929 (2007); see also Clifton McCleskey, Along
the Midway: Some Thoughts on Democratic Constitution-Amending, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1012
(1968) (“Every schoolboy knows that our Constitution is subject to change through informal
processes as well as through formal amendment.”).
113 Gerken, supra note 112; see also Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (explaining the conflict between the idea of the “living
constitution” with originalism).
114 Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
115 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877–
78 (1996).
116 Id.
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the text in favor of extra-textual influences: “In fact, in the day-to-day
practice of constitutional interpretation, in the courts and in general
public discourse, the specific words of the text play at most a small role,
compared to evolving understandings of what the Constitution
requires.”117 Later, David Strauss took a stronger position, not only
recognizing constitutional change outside of the formal amendment
process but also arguing that Article V is neither necessary nor
sufficient for constitutional change.118
Arguably, the difficulty of amending formally via Article V created
the processes of change outside the text.119 The shift to informal
constitutional change when Article V is unavailable is all the more
expected in a functioning republic if we accept that amendability is, in
fact, necessary for the basic legitimacy of the government. Walter
Dellinger made this point well decades ago: “An unamendable
constitution, adopted by a generation long since dead, could hardly be
viewed as a manifestation of the consent of the governed.”120
The key debates about informal constitutional change focus on two
intertwined aspects: the mechanisms for those changes—including the
Id.
Strauss, supra note 111. For a critique of Strauss’s approach, see Brannon P. Denning &
John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL.
L. REV. 247, 248–49 (2002).
119 See Gerken, supra note 112, at 933 (“The simple point of my hydraulics argument is that
an informal amendment process exists because formal amendment is so difficult.”); Albert, supra
note 110, at 1062 (adopting Gerken’s argument that the formal pathway is blocked); see also
Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2121, 2121 (1996)
(“While the legalization of the Constitution made it enforceable, it also narrowed the scope of
constitutional law and opened the way for significant constitutional changes to occur through
ordinary political means.”); Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV.
739, 742 (2017) (“[Q]uasi-constitutional amendments are the result of a self-conscious
circumvention of onerous rules of formal amendment in order to alter the operation of a set of
existing norms in the constitution . . . Where constitutional actors determine, correctly or not,
that the current political landscape would frustrate their plans for a constitutional amendment
to entrench new policy preferences, they resort instead to sub-constitutional means—for
instance, legislation or political practice—whose success requires less or perhaps even no crossparty and inter-institutional coordination.”).
120 Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment
Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 386–87 (1983). Dellinger concluded, “Without a viable process for
changing the original governing norm, however, the Constitution would fail to provide a
sufficient underpinning for the legitimacy of government.” Id. at 387. Notably, Dellinger did not
make this argument in the context of recognizing informal change. Indeed, Dellinger worried
about exactly that problem: “If we are to agree on what the fundamental law is, we need to have
an amendment process that operates with a fair degree of certainty. Substantial doubt about
whether amendments had properly been adopted would be a matter of serious concern: it would
leave us without an agreed-upon text to serve as the basic reference point from which to assess
the legitimacy of government and its actions.” Id. But see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, &
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 82 (2009) (“[B]elow some
threshold, flexibility should clearly enhance constitutional endurance . . . .”).
117
118
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interpretive approach which minimizes change—and the legitimacy of
such changes.121
Those who focus on interpretation often argue against extratextual change, accounting for any shifts in terms of simply the vagaries
of judicial interpretation. To some degree, the interpretive position is a
reaction to those who have set forth accounts of legitimate extra-textual
change.122 Some accounts of interpretation sharply discount extratextual change. One reason to do so is that sharp deviations through
judicial interpretation present a problem for a democratic republic,123
particularly when the Court’s interpretations prompt change rather
than responding to popular demand.124
Other accounts of interpretation recognize that a high level of
change might occur simply through interpretive shifts: the Constitution
“has been dramatically refurbished from time to time through the
judiciary’s interpretation of its provisions.”125 Lawrence Lessig, for
example, accounted for constitutional change in an interpretive context,
but denied that such change “requires amendment.”126 The
121 Heather Gerken, supra note 112; see also Strauss, supra note 115, at 878 (“An air of
illegitimacy surrounds any alleged departure from the text or the original understandings.”).
122 Responding to Ackerman and Akhil Reed Amar, who both outlined ideas of change
outside Article V, David Dow wrote, “My thesis is that the only way to amend the Constitution
is in accordance with the mechanism outlined in article V. My further claim is that the
mechanism outlined in article V is clear, exclusive, and that it means what it says. There are
simply no other ways to amend the Constitution.” David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We
Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
123 See Sager, supra note 105, at 896–97 (“Judicial change by reinterpretation, of course, is
different than popular amendment of the Constitution for these purposes: it is much harder to
account for as a prominent feature of government in a nation which extols popular sovereignty.
Indeed, it is robust judicial interpretation of the Constitution which often is seen as the difficulty
in squaring our constitutional tradition with the precept of popular sovereignty.”).
124 Id. at 896 (“Moreover, much of the change in our constitutional tradition has been at the
hands of the judiciary and by no means in simple harmony with changes in popular sentiment
or judgment on the matters in question. Judicial interpretation of the Constitution at times has
preceded and been an active catalyst of widespread changes in social practice and commitment;
at times it has lagged rather badly behind such changes; and at times, while simply never
achieving general rapport with popular perspectives, it has still clung tenaciously to its
conclusions.”).
125 Id. at 896; see also Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution
Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
13, 33 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (challenging the idea that there is an effective way to
distinguish between interpretation and amendment).
126 Lessig, supra note 111, at 400. Lessig explains, “It is this assumption that I challenge directly
in the account below. As I argue, we have long recognized cases where, in the face of changes in
context, the proper act of fidelity is a changed reading of the constitutional text—constitutional
change, that is, without constitutional amendment. As others have before, I will call this a
justification of translation . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Richard Albert has
outlined a theory of quasi-constitutional amendments. See Albert, supra note 119, at 742.
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unavailability of formal amendment may, in fact, increase the likelihood
that Justices will engage in more flexible and inventive interpretation.127
Many scholars move beyond simple interpretation to
acknowledging methods of constitutional change explicitly extratextual or outside of Article V. One of the foremost accounts of informal
constitutional change comes from Bruce Ackerman. Ackerman
articulated a history of a limited number of specific, intentional, and
political acts by the people involving extensive debate and conflict,128
ultimately confirmed multiple branches of government that he views as
having created enduring constitutional change. Ackerman viewed these
changes as the product of “wrenching social crisis” that drove
Americans to “move beyond normal politics.”129 According to
Ackerman, these changes are legitimate, so long as they occur within
the constitutional moments pattern he identifies.130 In terms of the
process of amendment, Ackerman did not support this informal
process over Article V, instead saying that his theory is interpretive of
the history of constitutional change, rather than normative about the
methodology.
Ackerman’s account of informal constitutional change focuses, in
part, on the court packing threat of 1937. Ackerman concludes that “the
President and Congress left it to the Justices themselves to codify the
New Deal revolution in a series of transformative judicial opinions,
threatening to pack the Court unless it accepted this novel

127 See Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, supra note 108, at 56 (“Many Americans and
prominent scholars believe that Article: V’s arduous amendment procedures embolden the
Justices because they know that unpopular constitutional rulings are unlikely to be displaced by
responsive amendments. This is surely true to a degree. The Supreme Court has all but admitted
that it takes more liberty in overruling constitutional precedent because of Article: V’s rigidity.”).
Marshfield observes that it is “commonplace in constitutional scholarship to identify Article V’s
rigidity as a cause of the court’s relative activism.” Id. at 57.
128 Sustained debate is a key feature, although not a sufficient one for constitutional change in
other accounts as well. See Melissa Schwartzberg, Should Progressive Constitutionalism Embrace
Popular Constitutionalism?, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1308 (2011) (reflecting on sustained
deliberation within Eskridge and Freejohn’s model and the requirement more generally).
129 ACKERMAN, supra note 103.
130 See Ackerman, supra note 27, at 1056 (“Thus, when today’s lawyers invoke the name of
Lochner v. New York, they are dealing with a constitutional symbol with all the potency of a
formal amendment under Article V.”); see also Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup:
Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 8 (2002) (“The
‘Roosevelt revolution,’ he maintains, should ‘be viewed as a constitutive act of popular
sovereignty that legitimately changed the preceding Republican Constitution.’ For Ackerman,
‘the language of popular sovereignty provides an appropriate description for the constitutional
transformations achieved during this period.’ Constitutional lawyers should therefore ‘recognize
that Americans of this era hammered new fundamental commitments which we today have a
constitutional obligation to honor.’” (quoting 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 280 (1998)).
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constitutional responsibility.”131 Ackerman’s account suggests that the
Supreme Court intentionally switched positions for the sake of its
continued institutional legitimacy. As a result, the court accepts the
“unchallengeable constitutional reality” of “an activist, regulatory
state.”132
Ackerman’s account of informal constitutional change now
competes with a number of other well-known accounts. Mark Tushnet
explained constitutional change in terms of workarounds,133 which may
be considered more like the interpretive position in that these
workarounds express fidelity to at least some part of the textual
Constitution.134 Tushnet’s workarounds “arise (a) when there is
significant political pressure to accomplish some goal, but (b) some
parts of the Constitution’s text seem fairly clear in prohibiting people
from reaching that goal directly, yet (c) there appear to be other ways of
reaching the goal that fit comfortably within the Constitution.”135
Tushnet’s theory accounts for constitutional change only where “[o]ne
part of the text prohibits something, other parts of the text permit it,
and the Constitution itself does not appear to give either part priority
over the other.”136 Therefore, the workarounds theory, at most,
accounts for only a portion of the constitutional change recognized by
other scholars.
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s account of super-statutes
accounts for some level of informal constitutional change that may also
be seen as interpretive. Their super-statutes result from “lengthy
normative debate about a vexing social or economic problem” that
results in a law that is “robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over
time, such that its earlier critics are discredited and its policy and
principles become axiomatic for the public culture.”137 A super-statute
becomes “one of the baselines against which other sources of law—

ACKERMAN, supra note 103, at 119.
Id. at 40.
133 Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Change: Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499,
1503–04 (2009). Tushnet provides a typology of these workarounds. Id. at 1504–08. Jonathan
Marshfield’s more recent theory of “amendment creep” appears to be a subcategory of Tushnet’s
workarounds—one specific to the use of Article V to interpret other constitutional provisions.
See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215 (2016) (examining how
judges use the formal Article V rules “when interpreting other constitutional provisions”).
134 Tushnet situates his approach as similar to both the interpretive positions and Ackerman’s
theory: “Yet another way of understanding constitutional workarounds is to see them as a
method of amending the Constitution without altering its text, in the same family as judicial
interpretation and ‘constitutional moments.’” Tushnet, supra note 133, at 1510.
135 Id. at 1503.
136 Id. at 1504.
137 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
131
132
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sometimes including the Constitution itself—are read,” and therefore
“[o]ccasionally,
super-statutes
can
reshape
constitutional
138
understandings.” Eskridge and Ferejohn recognize a concept of
“quasi- constitutional” laws, capable of “alter[ing] substantially the
then-existing regulatory baselines with a new principle or policy.”139
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule advance a theory of legislative
entrenchment. In their definition, such statutes “are binding against
subsequent legislative action in the same form.”140 Posner & Vermeule
reject an equivalence with constitutional change,141 because these
statutes lack powers normal to constitutional amendment, such as
expanding governmental powers.142 They conclude that “entrenching
statutes are just a unique legal instrument,” and yet they describe
entrenching statutes as having the power to “bind later legislatures.”143
This understanding is only possible if one is willing to break with the
traditional higher/ordinary law dichotomy, which would suggest that
any law capable of binding future legislatures is some form of
constitutional change, if not an explicit amendment.
All of these accounts seek to explain and/or legitimate a process of
informal constitutional change, and thereby—while disagreeing on a
variety of points and having many distinct features—all acknowledge
not only the existence, but also the importance of informal
constitutional change.
C.

Structure, Rights & Effective Constitutional Change

Theories of informal constitutional change incorporate examples
of rights-based changes, structural changes,144 or a mixture of the two.
Ackerman’s constitutional moments theory contains examples of
multiple types. He described the New Deal in terms of the rise of the
federal economic order and social welfare, as well as the development
of the administrative state. Ackerman’s account followed soon after
Michael Parrish’s, which pointed to the New Deal as a “constitutional
Id.
Id. at 1230.
140 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1680 (2002).
141 Posner & Vermeule conclude, “Entrenching provisions are not amendments, nor are they
‘equivalent’ to amendments in either a de jure or a de facto sense.” Id.
142 See id. at 1680–81.
143 Id. at 1681.
144 Structural constitutional changes may be defined as those involving the powers, purposes,
or functions of primary governmental institutions recognized in the Constitution, along with the
relationships among those institutions.
138
139
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revolution,” which not only “permanently and dramatically changed
the role of the judiciary,”145 but also resulted in the development of a
national economic policy,146 the creation of a federalized social-welfare
system,147 and the rise of the “imperial presidency.”148 On the other
hand, Ackerman’s account of the Civil Rights Revolution posits rightsbased changes rather than structural ones.149
But of the many examples of informal constitutional amendment,
which ones created enduring constitutional change? The evidence more
clearly favors informal change successfully creating constitutional
changes that are structural, rather than rights based. Those that are
rights-based tend more towards slippage over time.
Ackerman ties his 1937 “constitutional moment” to two key
structural changes: first, the development of the administrative state
and second, the rise of presidential power. Ackerman was far from the
first scholar to emphasize the New Deal’s role in the rise of the federal
regulatory world. For at least four decades historians and legal scholars
have traced the rise of the administrative state. Robert Rabin explained
the development of the modern administrative state in terms of “eras”
of regulatory change.150
Scholars also regularly explain why the administrative state is
unconstitutional. In 1994, Gary Lawson wrote about “[t]he [d]eath of
[c]onstitutional [g]overnment” in connection with the administrative
agencies.151 Lawson argued multiple reasons why the agencies offended
the structural systems laid out within the Constitution:
Moreover, Congress frequently delegates that general legislative
authority to administrative agencies, in contravention of Article I.
Furthermore, those agencies are not always subject to the direct
control of the President, in contravention of Article II. In addition,
those agencies sometimes exercise the judicial power, in
contravention of Article III. Finally, those agencies typically
concentrate legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the same
institution, in simultaneous contravention of Articles I, II, and III.152

145 Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59
WASH. L. REV. 723, 726 (1984).
146 Id. at 726.
147 Id. at 727.
148 Id. at 726–27.
149 ACKERMAN, supra note 16.
150 Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191
(1986).
151 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233
(1994).
152 Id.
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Lawson concluded, “The post-New Deal administrative state is
unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to
nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”153 Moreover,
by his account, this was no accident. He alleged, “The original New
Dealers were aware, at least to some degree, that their vision of the
national government’s proper role and structure could not be squared
with the written Constitution.”154
The only way to deny a constitutional problem with the modern
administrative state is to reject the idea that any change has occurred.
In this approach, “The scope of national regulatory power finally
sustained by the Supreme Court in the late thirties is said to find firm
roots in 1789 understandings and early Marshall Court decisions
construing the necessary and proper and commerce clauses, and the
contrary intervening case law is dismissed as in error.”155
Whether or not the rise of the administrative state is constitutional,
this modern form of government has shown great tenacity. Gary
Lawson concluded, “Faced with a choice between the administrative
state and the Constitution, the architects of our modern government
chose the administrative state, and their choice has stuck.”156 By his
evaluation, despite the questionable status, “the essential features of the
modern administrative state have, for more than half a century, been
taken as unchallengeable postulates by virtually all players in the legal
and political worlds, including the Reagan and Bush
administrations.”157 As a result, Lawson determined, “The post-New
Deal conception of the national government has not changed one iota,
nor even been a serious subject of discussion, since the Revolution of
1937.”158
Similarly, scholars agree on the enduring change to the power of
the presidency.159 To some minds, the rise of presidential power is
enough of a constitutional change to potentially unbalance our
constitutional structure. In 1973, Two-time Pulitzer prize winning
historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., wrote The Imperial Presidency, a book
that narrates a history of the rise of presidential power and plots

Id. at 1231.
Id.
155 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 730 (1988).
156 Lawson, supra note 151, at 1231.
157 Id. at 1232.
158 Id. at 1231.
159 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1459 (2001) (noting scholarly agreement that the expansion of executive power created
informal change).
153
154
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solutions for the problem of expanding, centralized power.160 Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule, similarly traced this history, although
arguing that the centralization of power within the President is a natural
byproduct of modernity.161 Andrew Rudalevige would place the blame,
at least part, on Congress, which he says has not effectively engaged
mechanisms to check presidential power.162 Ackerman argued that not
only has presidential power increased unreasonably, but also that it has
reinforced political extremism.163 This rise of presidential power
appears to be an enduring, informal constitutional change.
On the other hand, many scholars linked the New Deal not only to
the administrative state, but also to a particular social perspective: that
of the activist, regulatory, welfare state. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
scholars, traced the evolution of the Commerce Clause specifically to
the New Deal era decisions, concluding that congress possessed broad
powers to remedy national social ills.164 Elizabeth Price explained,
“Broad judicial construction of the power to regulate commerce,
particularly since the New Deal, has, in the eyes of many (if not most)
legal scholars, effectively given Congress a general police power.”165
Whether viewed as a product of improper jurisprudence and
reinterpretation,166 or an informal constitutional change, many scholars

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
162 ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2006).
163 See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010).
164 Michael Belknap wrote, “When Roosevelt took office, the Court was still interpreting
the Constitution in such a way as to impose significant restraints on the regulatory activity of the
federal government. By the end of the New Deal, however, federal power over economic and
social matters had become essentially limitless.” Michael Belknap, The New Deal and the
Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (1983).
165 Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor
Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 142 (1998); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress,
Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 253 (1996) (“In the
1930s the powers of the national government were expanded in an extraordinary way, in favor of
a system that exercised something close to general police powers.”); Lawson, supra note 151, at
1233 (“The United States Congress today effectively exercises general legislative powers, in
contravention of the constitutional principle of limited powers.”).
166 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388
(1987) (rejecting this line of interpretation of the Commerce Clause because of the improper
powers with which it imbues Congress); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power & Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995)
(concluding that the interpretation that will “allow Congress to do anything it wants under the
commerce power”).
160
161
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commented on this historical trajectory toward a stronger and stronger
welfare state.
Then the Supreme Court decided Lopez and Morrison. In 1995,
United States v. Lopez declared the Gun Free Schools Act
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.167 Then in 2000, after
exceptional social energy went into enacting a federal civil-remedy for
victims of gender-based violence, the Supreme Court struck the statute
down in United States v. Morrison.168 Gender-based violence was, in the
view of the Morrison Court, a local matter, and the “Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.”169 More importantly, gender-based violence is a social and
criminal issue, and like guns, not an economic one.170 Scholars could no
longer clearly trace a general police power of Congress back to 1937. At
the same time, the administrative state and the assorted regulatory
regimes continued unhindered, as did the expanded executive power.
While the social welfare component of the constitutional change
experienced slippage, the structural component remained steady.
The problem is simple: Informal constitutional changes involve an
unavoidable fuzziness. Gerken argued, “it is hard for judges to define
the precise content of informal amendments and even harder for judges
to acknowledge their existence, informal amendments occupy an odd
constitutional status. They make it hard for anyone to claim access to
an authentic account of constitutional meaning.”171 She described this
as a product of the “vagueness and quasi-illicit status of informal
amendments.”172 Ackerman acknowledged that an “evolutionary
approach contains great dangers,” emerging from the fact that the
movement does not “pin its transformative message down in a formal
amendment,” and as a result “relies very heavily on the good judgment
of courts.”173 When compared, structural changes and rights-based
changes differ in their cultural fluidity. Without text, it is much more
difficult to outline, preserve, and enforce a change in constitutional

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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rights. Changes in structure, on the other hand, benefit from
institutional preservation of power and institutional maintenance work.
This conclusion about informal constitutional’s change and its
effectiveness should be alarming. If any type of change should be done,
carefully, deliberatively, and formally, it should be a change that alters
the very structure of our republic.
D.

Court Packing and Effective Constitutional Change

If the primary purpose of court packing or the threat of court
packing is informal constitutional change, then the key question should
be what type of change is desired. Our history suggests that court
packing could be utilized more clearly and lastingly for structural
change. The problem, however, is that the direct structural change of
court packing is simply a larger court. Additionally, to the degree that
court packing feels retributive, this type of structural change, set only in
a single statute, would likely reverse with the next election of a President
from the opposing political party. On the other hand, one could,
potentially, aim for a specifically politically balanced court, as the one
suggested by Epps and Sitaraman.174 If however, such a court is created
by statute—as court packing could be—then it would need
entrenchment, which might or might not be feasible, for any chance at
longevity.
Any attempt to change substantive rights via court packing would
encounter slippage in the future, even if temporarily effective. Logically
then, court packing should be used only if needed for a temporary goal.
For example, court packing might be necessary and effective in the short
run if the current Justices so altered voting rights that constitutional
amendment became impossible without first re-establishing proper
access to voting. In this example, court packing would be a corrective
and temporary measure, put in place as a part of a larger plan of
constitutional change. Court packing would need to be followed with a
better method of establishing long-term change, such as formal
amendment, or at least a statute that might achieve the special status of
“transformative” in Ackerman’s lexicon or a “super-statute” in Eskridge
and Ferejohn’s.
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CONCLUSION
The original arguments against court packing carry less weight in
the current social and constitutional era. Less weight, however, implies
some validity to those concerns and within those arguments is an
acknowledgement that court packing comes with some risk to
governmental stability. Still, the original arguments against court
packing cannot be categorized as strong in the current climate.
A better argument against court packing is simply that it is unlikely
to be effective for any long-term informal constitutional change that is
responsive to key social issues. Informal constitutional change is more
clearly stable when it involves structural change rather than rightsbased change. In light of this, a goal of an enduring and publicly
accepted statute is more promising than court packing. A better
solution is re-learning how to formally amend the constitution.

